Wills - Ademption - Protection of an Incompetent Testator\u27s Intention by James, Bailey
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 41 Number 4 Article 9 
1964 
Wills - Ademption - Protection of an Incompetent Testator's 
Intention 
Bailey James 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James, Bailey (1964) "Wills - Ademption - Protection of an Incompetent Testator's Intention," North Dakota 
Law Review: Vol. 41 : No. 4 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol41/iss4/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
WILLS - ADEMPTION - PROTECTION OF AN INCOMPETENT TES-
TATOR'S INTENTION-Appellant, a specific devisee in a will, was
to receive the testator's home. The testator became incompetent
and by court order the guardian sold the home for $21,000 and used
the proceeds to care for the incompetent testator. The remainder
of the estate consisted of $6,000 residuary that was to go to the
respondent. At the time of the testator's death all but $500 of the
$21,000 had been used for her care. The Supreme Court of California
held that there was no ademption and that the appellant was entitled
to have his devise redeemed to the extent that was possible from
the remainder of the estate according to the contribution statute
which specifically excludes residuary devisees. In re Estate of Mary
Mason, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005 (1965).
The recent trend in the law of ademption has been to em-
phasize the intention of the testator., Up to this time there have
been three different views on the subject of ademption. England
2
and a few American jurisdictions3 follow the strict "in specie"
test of ademption.4 Under this view the devise is adeemed if the
property is not in the estate at the testator's death. 5 The Scottish
courts base the test on what the testator would have done had he
been competent.6 Thus there is an ademption if the testator would
have extinguished the object of the devise, but there is no ademption
if he Would not have done so.7 This view recognizes the intention
of the testator no further than the presumption that everyone would
handle his estate in the most advantageous manner." The majority
view in the United States is set out in the landmark case of Wilmer-
ton v. Wilmerton.9 If the guardian sells the object of a specific
devise the gift is not adeemed at the testator's death if the proceeds
1. Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896 (7th Cir. 1910); In re Bierstedt's Estate,
254 Iowa 772, 119 N.W.2d 234 (1963).
2. E.g., Jones v. Green, L.R. 1 Eq. 555 (1868).
3. In re Brann, 219 N.Y. 263, 114 N.E. 404 (1916) ; In re Barrow's Estate, 103 Vt.
601, 156 Atl. 408 (1931).
4. In re Brann, supra note 3. These courts recognize that in many jurisdictions
ademption is thought to contain the element of intention on the part of the testator. They
state, however, that this has ceased to be the law in the jurisdictions applying the in
specie test in the absence of a statute.
5. In re Barrow's Estate, supra note 3.
6. 6 BowE-PARKm: PAGE ON WILLS, § 54.18, at 273.
7. Ibid.
8. See, In re Barrow's Estate, supra note 3.
9. Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 8upra note 1 at 900. ". . . [W]e think that the rule, that
legacies are adeemed only where such an intention appears on the part of the testator
himself, ought to be followed."
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can be followed, or if he sells an object of a specific devise and
uses the proceeds for the care of the ward there is only an ademp-
tion of the proceeds that have been used. 10
The paramount importance of carrying out the testator's inten-
tion is illustrated by the holding in the instant case. Thus the
testator's incompetency raises the question of whether his ability to
form a legal intention passes to the guardian. The response to this
issue should be in the negative, however, since the role of the
guardian is purely administrative. 1' He is not appointed to change
the testamentary plan of the testator,'1 2 nor should he be allowed
the power to do so.
There are two basic situations in which the problem of ademp-
tion by a guardian of an incompetent testator may arise. They are
where the testator becomes incompetent and remains so until his
death, and where the testator becomes incompetent but regains
competency before his death.
In the first situation it is obvious that the testator meant to
give the devisee something of value. But if the proceeds from the
specific devise are used to support the incompetent testator there
is at the least a pro tanto ademption of that amount, and the tes-
tator's intention is defeated. This ademption should not be recog-
nized because if the testator does not regain competency before
his death the cost of supporting the ward is not substantially
different from an expense of the estate. If the debts for his care
are not paid until after his death they are surely a debt of the
estate. Both California 3 and North Dakota" provide for a method
of contribution by the devisees of a will if there is an insufficient
fund for that purpose. Disregarding the idea of ademption and
using the contribution statutes seems to present the best view for
handling this type of situation since each devisee contributes propor-
tionately to the debts of the estate in the method set forth by the
legislature.
In the second situation it would seem that if the testator regains
competency he would be presumed to know the condition of his
estate. If he does not change his will then an object of a specific
10. In re Bierstedt's Estate, supra note 1.
11. In re Cooper's Estate, 95 N.J. Eq. 210, 123 Atl. 45 (1923).
12. Ibid.
13. CAL. PROB. CODE § 753: "When property given by will to persons other than the
residuary devisees and legatees is sold for the payment of debts or expenses or family
allowance, all the devisees and legatees must contribute according to their respective
interests to the devisee or legatee whose devise or legacy has been sold, and the court,
when distribution is made, must settle the* amount of the several liabilities and decree
the amount each person shall contribute, and reserve the same from his distributive
share for the purpose of such contribution."
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-21-18 (1960): "If an estate given by will has been sold
for the payment of debts or expenses, all the devisees and legatees must contribute, ac-
cording to their respective interests, to the devisee or legatee whose devise or legacy has
been taken therefor, and the county court, when distribution is made, must settle the
amount of the several liabilities by decree and determine the amount which each person
shall contribute. Such amount shall be reserved from the distributive shares of the devisees
and legatees affected respectively for the purpose of paying the amounts to be contributed."
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devise that had been destroyed during his incompetency would be
considered adeemed by the testator's intention. 15 This does not
conflict with the holding in the instant case as it is a well settled
rule that there is an ademption when the testator knows and does
nothing to remedy the destruction of an object of a specific devise.1 6
The decision in this case gives a just and well-reasoned result
in the first situation and does nothing to hinder a just result in
the second situation. By applying the foregoing reasoning to similar
cases, the courts can provide an equitable solution to this small
but confused area of the law.
JAMES BAILEY
TORTS-INVASION OF PRIVACY-INFANTS' RIGHT TO A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR ENTICING PARENT-By invoking the i n v a s io n
of privacy principle,1 the minor plaintiffs alleged that the female
defendant disrupted the family circle by enticing the father to
leave the home. The children claimed they were deprived of their
father's affection, companionship and guidance and subjected to un-
wanted notoriety. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with one justice
dissenting,2 held that this action arose out of the marital contract
in which the spouse was the sole beneficiary. Thus the action could
not be upheld due to a lack of common law precedent or statutory
authorization. Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St. 2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 338
(1964).
Except where prohibited by stdtutes the gist of the action
by a minor seems to be related to the common law concept of
alienation of affection which allows recovery for loss of Consortium
by a spouse.4 Decisions allowing recovery by a minor against a
third person have been based on the theories of ubi jus ibi reme-
dium5 and invasion of privacy. While some state constitutions
15. See, In re Blerstedt's Estate, supra note 1..
16. See e.g., In re Ireland's Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931) ; In re Brann,
supra note 3.
1. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
2. The dissenting ju.stice believed there was an Injury to the minor plaintiffs and
based recovery upon the OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16, which allows a remedy for a wrong
done to a person.
3. Seven states have abolished the cause of action for alienation of affection by
adopting "Heart Balm Statutes." See: Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York and Wyoming. Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have abolished the
action only for breach of promise to marry. Michigan and Pennsylvania passed the
statute with the exception that It does not apply to suits by a husband or wife against
a defendant who is a parent, brother, sister or person In loco parentis of the plaintiff's
spouse. Illinois repealed the "Heart Balm Statute" because it violated their state con-
stitution which provides a remedy for a wrong done to a person. Heck v. Schupp, 394
Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
4. Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947).
5. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). See Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill.
App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947), which based recovery on the state constitution, and
Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949), which held that If a wrong has
been committed there should be a remedy.
6. Miller v. Monsen, supra note 1.
